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Statement of the Case and Factual Summary

On October 25, 2010, Officer Dustin Cook of the Idaho Falls Police Department saw
Rosemary Dycus enter a Common Cents convenience store. Transcript, Motion to Suppress
Hearing, January 31, 2011, p. 6. Although initially contradictory, the officer ultimately clarified
that he did not conduct a formal traffic stop of Ms. Dycus's vehicle, although he had information
that she was driving without privileges. ld. at p. 6, 7, and 13. He began observing the entrance
waiting for Ms. Dycus and other officers arTived at the scene. ld. at 7. The officer determined
that she had entered the restroom, but found that the door was locked by its occupant. !d. at 10.
After knocking and announcing his presence, Ms. Dycus asked him to "wait a minute" as she
flushed the toilet. ld. at 11. However, the impatient officer decided to get the restroom key from
the store clerk and force his way into the restroom. ld. at 12. Inside the restroom, he found Ms.
Dycus, who was still getting dressed, as well as her jacket on the floor.

ld. at 12-13. He

searched the jacket and found a marijuana pipe. ld. at 13. At no point during these events did
Officer Cook apply for a warrant. See id. Ms. Dycus was ultimately charged with Paraphanalia,
as well as Driving Without Privileges (DWP).

Procedural History

The Defendant, Rosemary Pearl Dycus, was convicted in the United States District Court
for the Seventh Judicial District for the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville on
October 25, 2010. The Defendant initially was charged with violating I.C. 37-2734(A) for
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia-use or Possess with Intent to Use, and Driving Without
Privileges under I.e. 18-8001. Defendant brought a motion to suppress based on a violation of
her right to be free from unreasonable warrantless searches and siezures as well as violation of

her right of an expectation of privacy in a public restroom. Defendant's motion was heard and
denied by the Magistrate Court.

Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State whereby she would plead guilty to
Possession of Paraph em alia, and in consideration the state would dismiss the DWP. Pursuant to
the plea agreement, Defendant preserved her right to appeal the Magistrate Court's denial of her
suppression motion.

Defendant was sentenced on August 18, 2011, and was ordered to pay a fine of one
thousand dollars ($1000) with a sentence of 3 days in the Bonneville County jail with a
suspended sentence of 362 days. An informal probation tem1 of 2 years was also ordered.

Standard of Review

While the reviewing court defers to the factual findings of the trial court unless they are
clearly erroneous, it does exercise de novo review of whether the constitutional requirements
were satisfied in light of those facts. State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656, 658 (Ct. App. 1988).

This is an appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Seventh
Judicial District for the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville in a criminal case. On
August 24, 2011, a timely Notice of Appeal was filed from which this appeal follows.

Issue on Appeal
Did the District Court err in denying Defendant's appeal of the Magistrate's Court ruling
on Defendant's Motion to Suppress where a law enforcement officer forced his way into a
locked public restroom at a Common Cents convenience store where Rosemary Dycus had a
legitimate expectation 'of privacy and ultimately searched Defendant's person without a warrant?
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Argument

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT ROSEMARY DYCUS HAD A
LEGITIMENT EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE COMMON CENTS PUBLIC
RESTROOM
Because the officer unreasonably entered a locked public restroom without
permission or a warrant, the evidence should be suppressed unless Ms. Dycus did not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, as well as the FOUlih Amendment of the
United States Constitution, protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. These
protection apply to people, not places. State v. Limberhand, 117 Idaho 456, 459-60 (Ct. App.

1990); Katz v. Us., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

A warrantless search is presumed to be

unreasonable. State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225 (Idaho 1993); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
390 (1978).

Because Ms. Dycus had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the restroom, the
evidence found in the jacket that was on the floor of the restroom should be
suppressed as the fruit of an unconstitutional search and seizure.
The protections against unreasonable and warrantless searches applies to all areas
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which a person manifests a SUbjective expectation of privacy that society would objectively view
as reasonable. State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 749 (Idaho 19880); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, 1. concurring). If a person manifests a subjective expectation of privacy in a public
restroom, society would objectively recognize it as reasonable. Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 460.
Therefore, the only question remaining is whether Ms. Dycus manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in the public restroom.
To determine if a subjective expectation of privacy has manifested, the court examines
"the citizen's efforts to protect his own privacy from observation by the general public, taking
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into account norms of social conduct and the nature of the premises." State v. Morris, 131 Idaho
562, 565 (Ct. App. 1998). For example, a person who knowingly exposes an area to the public
cannot also manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in that area. State v. Delacerda, 135
Idaho 903,904 (et. App. 2001); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
A person can manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in a public restroom.

Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 459. In that case, the fact that the person kept the door closed while
he was inside the public stall and that all observable indicators (i.e. the position of his feet
viewable under the stall door) suggested normal use of the stall revealed his subjective
expectation of privacy. Id. He did this to prevent the public from viewing his activities in the
stall and "was utilizing the features of the stall to prevent exposure." Id. No actions revealed in
the record revealed any intent inconsistent with that expectation.

Id.

Therefore, the cOUli

concluded, Mr. Limberhand had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the public
restroom stall. Id.
The court also noted that the subjective expectation does not hinge on the design of the
restroom or stall. Id. This is because Article I, Section 17 and the Fourth Amendment protect
people, not places, from unreasonable intrusions. Id. at 459-60; Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. While an
area may be accessible to the public at other times, it may be put to a private use at any given
moment, and during the period when it is being used privately, the person using the area may
reasonably expect freedom from intrusions.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, 1. concurring)

(discussing the COUli's holding that a public telephone booth constitutes a private area when a
person enters it to make a call and uses the features of the booth to prevent the public from
overhearing his conversation).
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That same rationale applies to public restrooms.

Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 460.

Therefore, when a person locks themselves in a public restroom or stall, they are manifesting a
subjective expectation of privacy. See id.; see also Delacerda, 135 Idaho at 905. In Delacerda,
the complete absence of any provisions for privacy in the layout of the public restroom (i.e. no
stalls, dividers, or barriers between the multiple toilets, or most importantly, locks on the door),
there cannot be a subjective expectation of privacy, 135 Idaho at 905. The "visual openness of
the restroom interior, and the lack of any lock to exclude others with the restroom was in use"
meant that any activity undertaken in the restroom was knowingly exposed to the public. ld.,

emphasis added. This is because all activities, even the traditional and proper uses, may be
observed by any person also using the restroom or who walks into the restroom. ld.

Officers

are allowed to observe what a reasonably respectful person would observe from a legitimate
vantage point without a warrant. State v. Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 313 (et. App. 1993). Therefore,
there was no unreasonable search in Delacerda. 135 Idaho at 906. However, when the features
of the facility are employed to prevent others from observing activities in a public restroom (i.e.
by using a lock on the door), an invasion by officers is unreasonable, beyond the scope of what a
reasonably respectful person would be able to observe, and thus, violate Article I, Section 17 and
the Fourth Amendment. Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 460-61.
The fact that Ms. Dycus used the features of the restroom to prevent entry by the public
by employing the lock, she manifested a subjective expectation of privacy. See Transcript at 10;

contrast with Deiacera, 135 Idaho 905-06. Furthermore, there was no evidence in the record
suggesting that it was a multi-toilet restroom without any privacy screens.

Contrast with

Delacera, 135 Idaho 905-06. Rather, all that the officer testified to was that it was a uni-gender
restroom with a storage closet inside. See Transcript at 14-15. The fact that it was uni-gender
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suggests that it was a single-person restroom so that a man and a woman would not be subjected
to sharing the same private space while using the restroom.
The rest of the officer's observations also support a finding of a subjective expectation of
privacy. All the officer's observations from his legitimate vantage point outside the door are
consistent with the proper use of the restroom.

See Transcript at 11-12; compare with

Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 459. When Ms. Dycus entered the restroom, she locked the door.

Transcript at 10. When someone knocked on the door, she asked them to wait a moment while
she finished using the restroom and prepared herself to leave. !d. at 11-12. The magistrate found
that the facts showed no indication of improper use of the facilities. Id. at 22. As it is not clearly
erroneous, this finding is binding on the reviewing court. See Heinen, 114 Idaho at 658.
The protections of Article I, Section 17 and the Fourth Amendment also do not hinge on
the purpose of the invasion. See id. The magistrate held that because the entry was unrelated to
the criminal act the officer was investigating (DWP), no expectation of privacy could exist.
Transcript at 22. In fact, she recognized that nothing in the record indicated any improper use of
the restroom at all. Id. Officers cannot even establish reasonable suspicion based only on their
speculations of wrongdoing, much less establish the probable cause necessary to obtain a warrant
or justify a walTantless search. See State v. Deen, 131 Idaho 435, 436 (Idaho 1998). The fact
that the officer was investigating a DWP is irrelevant, lest the protections of Article I, Section 17
and the Fourth Amendment become meaningless. Such a perspective would allow an officer to
invade any area, including the sanctity of the home, without a warrant, so long as they claim to
be investigating a minor infraction or misdemeanor (i.e. noise disturbance) and then prosecute
for any crime for which evidence happens to be uncovered during the warrantless search. This
approach, as taken by the magistrate, does not conform with established search and seizure case
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law.

Rather, the only relevant inquiries are:

1) whether the person manifested a subjective

expectation of privacy that society would objectively recognize as reasonable; and 2) if so,
whether the presumption of invalidity is overcome by an applicable exception. See Thornpson,
114 Idaho at 749; see also Curl, 125 Idaho at 225.
As to the first relevant inquiry, Ms. Dycus did manifest a subjective expectation of
privacy that society would objectively recognize as reasonable. See Limberhand, 117 Idaho at
459-60. The officer entered that protected area without a wan'ant. See generally Transcript. He
looked through the jacket that was in the protected space, which constitutes a search.

See

Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 460 (holding that any invasion of the privacy interest, even if it is only
visual, constitutes a search for constitutional purposes). Therefore, the search is presumed to be
unreasonable unless there is an applicable exception to the warrant requirement. Curl, 125 Idaho
at 225; Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390. None of the exceptions apply in this case. Therefore, the
evidence found during the search must be suppressed. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219
(Idaho 1999); State v. Fancher, 145 Idaho 832,840 (Ct. App. 2008).

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING A REVOCATION OF DEFENDANT'S
PERMISSION TO USE THE PUBLIC RESTROOM
The District Court correctly found that when Rosemary Dycus entered into the Common
Cents restroom, she had a privacy interest upon entering that facility. The District Court erred in
finding that an agent of Common Cents revoked their permission for her continued use of the
bathroom when the officer acquired the key from the clerk. The District Court's analysis is
flawed because it discounts the State's action. The Common Cents clerk did not call the police
and request they remove Dycus from the restroom.

The officer followed Ms. Dycus in the

building pounded on the door and retrieved the key from the clerk. At Defendant's Motion to
Suppress Hearing, the State did not call the clerk as a witness and no other testimony was offered
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suggesting an agent of the Common Cents revoked Ms. Dycus' permission to use the restroom,
prior to the officer acquiring the key and entering the restroom.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FINDING OF THE
PARAPHERNALIA WAS INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
The District Court erred in finding that the discovery of the paraphemalia was inevitable
and therefore falls under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. To reach such a conclusion, the
District Court has to ignore an important fact and the two inescapable consequences of that fact.
The bathroom Ms. Dycus was in was a public restroom. Granted it is possible that Ms. Dycus
would have left the paraphemalia on her person, but it is also conceivable that she would not
have and would take other action. The fact that Ms. Dycus had options as to her behavior
contradicts a foregone conclusion required for inevitable discovery. Unless Ms. Dycus left the
marijuana pipe in her coat then the state would first have had to find it and second, they would
then have had to be able to connect the pipe with Ms. Dycus.
In the event Ms. Dycus abandoned the pipe, then the officer would have had to find it.
The officer stated he searched Ms. Dycus but does not go into detail of the extent of the search
he conducted into the restroom.

Without testimony to that effect, discovery is not only not

inevitable, but highly unlikely. Second, even if Ms. Dycus had placed the pipe in plain view, this
was a public place and state would have faced a large evidentiary hurdle connecting the pipe to
Ms. Dycus.

Conclusion
Because Ms. Dycus manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the public restroom
and because society would objectively recognize that expectation as reasonable, Ms. Dycus had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the restroom, and the warrantless search of that area is

8

presumed to be unreasonable. No exceptions validate the search and prevent the evidence's
suppression. Neither revocation of Defendant's permission to use the Common Cents restroom,
nor inevitable discovery justifies the officer's forced entry into a bathroom being used by Ms.
Dycus.
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Dycus requests this court to reverse the
District Court's denial of her motion to suppress, vacate her conviction and remand this case for
further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED this 20 th day of May, 2012.

TIMOTHY D. FRENCH
Deputy Public Defender
Attorney for Appellant
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